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In the last decade, web application development is moving toward the adoption
of Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA). Accordingly to this trend, Software as
a Service (SaaS) and Serverless providers are embracing DevOps with the latest
tools to facilitate the creation, maintenance and scalability of microservices system
configuration.
Even if within this trend, security is still an open point that is too often underesti-
mated. Many companies are still thinking about security as a set of controls that
have to be checked before the software is used in production. In reality, security
needs to be taken into account all along the entire Software Development Lifecycle
(SDL).
In this thesis, state of the art security recommendations for microservice architec-
ture are reviewed, and useful improvements are given. The main target is for secure
to become integrated better into a company workflow, increasing security awareness
and simplifying the integration of security measures throughout the SDL.
With this background, best practices and recommendations are compared with what
companies are currently doing in securing their service-oriented infrastructures.
The assumption that there still is much ground to cover security-wise still standing.
Lastly, a small case study is presented and used as proof of how small and dynamic
startups can be the front runners of high cybersecurity standards. The results of
the analysis show that it is easier to integrate up-to-date security measures in a
small company.
Keywords: microservices, containers, security, testing, software development lifecy-
cle, SaaS, Serverless, Service-Oriented Architecture
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, each of us benefits from a variety of services available online by accessing
them through different terminals. By registering for the service it is usually possible
to access the same functionalities, as well as the same data. This has allowed during
the last decade to decrease the need of using the same device in favor of a greater
dependence on the service and its related data. Also the cyber security world has
been affected by the change, shifting more and more the attention towards web
applications and the data flow generated by them. As stated by the 2020 Verizon
Security Report[1], nowadays more than the 90% of breaches have web applications
as hacking vectors, confirming the growing trend if compared to the same report from
previous year[2]. Indeed, this information confirms that many of the applications
that few years ago were installed on a desktop, nowadays can be used from a standard
web browser.
During the decades, the growing demand of software challenged software archi-
tects to came up with designs able to meet requirements and, at the same time,
be resilient enough to support changes. Thus, code bases irremediably experienced
an exponential growth in size, complicating more and more the management of the
product itself. This created the need for a new solution that would allow the com-
plexity of the product to be separated, making it easier to develop and manage.
Microservice architecture was the answer to this need, the one which has been able
to solve many problems that businesses were struggling with. Despite the benefits
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that this technology brings to organizations today, the implementation of this ar-
chitecture can be more complex. In parallel, the safety of the platforms that take
advantage of this design has also had to adapt to the new introduced challenges.
This study seeks to address the management of safety in the new ecosystem re-
sulting from the combination of the two trends described above. The Web applica-
tion based on microservice architecture is today the most advanced and widespread
solution in software engineering. Ensuring this technology as accurately as possible
is therefore a subject that deserves to be explored in depth and is, moreover, the
aim of this study. Thus, the thesis will try to understand which are the best specific
tools that have been created or adopted specifically for microservice environments.
The market demands for secure platforms and companies should adopt (or aim for
adopting) the most up-to-date recommendations to satisfy such requirement. For
this reason, framing how companies are doing security-wise speaking will be another
objective of this thesis. Nevertheless, an investigation will be conducted into how
the size of the business can influence the cyber security of the web applications that
the companies themselves offer on the market.
The second chapter of the thesis provides a wide understanding over the methods,
tools and techniques that will often be recalled in the paper. In the third one, a
complete and up-to-date overview of the elements that allows companies to increase
security among all the software development process is offered, while in the fourth
chapter some innovative methodologies are proposed as integration of the previously
explained framework. The fifth chapter’s aim is to compare the provided set of
best practices with what is currently implemented and used by average in tech
companies panorama. Lastly, a case study of a small startup and its security vision
is analyzed to understand strengths and weaknesses that derives from its small
structure. Conclusions close the thesis, using the results of the analysis to answer
the open points raised initially and proposing future developments for this work.
2 Key principles and tools for Agile
Fast Development Workflow
In order to describe and study Information Security (InfoSec) and its application
in the microservices environment, it is important to clarify the context and some
main principles that will be useful to take for granted in the development of this
work. Even if the next sections may not be directly connected with InfoSec itself,
the definition of these assumptions are mandatory for the development of this study.
In the next sections security engineering aspects will be taken into account, as
well as some related Software Development Operation (DevOps) best practices and
basics. Main tools used in Microservices environment will be also described.
2.1 Agile security engineering method
The current security engineering found its baseline in the Agile software develop-
ment. Starting from 1990, companies started to shift from a traditional and ineffi-
cient software development to a more sophisticated and comprehensive method. As
examined by researchers Hoda, Salleh and Grundy[3], Agile introduced practicali-
ties and processes to boost the level of coordination within the teams, increasing
productivity and, more importantly, adapting the developed product based on the
stakeholder’s willing. The Agile Alliance, guided by Kent Beck, manage to enclose
such a big and powerful development methodology into few solid principles collected
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in the famous Agile Manifesto[4]. Each of them represents an essential milestone
where all Agile-based approaches need to base their philosophy.
According to the 13th Annual State of Agile Survey[5], in 2018 the 97% of all
the interviewed organizations reported to adopt agile methodology at least in one
team within the company, demonstrating the growth of the trend if compared with
the 84% of the first version of the survey, made in 2007[6].
During the years, the Agile concept has been interpreted in many ways, giving
rise to different specific methods. Despite the proliferation of proposals, few of
them have survived in the past decades. In particular, the Annual State of Agile
Survey[5] states that Scrum-based agile methodologies are still the most widely
adopted with a 72% of the 1319 people interviewed coming from all different kinds
of organizations. Few other methods populate the rest of the ranking, but the most
relevant is Kanban[7]: it is adopted as Scrumban (combination of Kanban and Scrum
with 8%) and Kanban itself (5%).
The co-creator of SCRUM, Jeff Sutherland, explains in his book[8] how such
process can be effective in plenty of different contexts that can easily lie outside
from software development. Also the previous mentioned paper[3] underline the
spreading of the Agile style in disciplines beyond software: project management,
marketing, human resources or sales are just few good examples that sustain the
statement.
Security engineering represents a field in which Agile methods can be applied
with enormous gains, especially if in conjunction with the software development flow.
An interesting study[9] made by K. Rindell, S. Hyrynsalmi, and V. Leppänen took
into account many different agile methodologies in order to analyze how security
perspective has been evolved and adopted within the methods itself. Among the
plethora of processes, the authors pointed out the slowness of the development
of such methods in security-wise perspective. Despite such delay, methodologies
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nowadays include security as important milestone of the process. Perhaps, the
study sadly highlights the detachment of theoretical usage from actual empirical
implementation: all the case studies that have been reviewed by the paper[9] shown
that reality is far from been compliant with security development recommendations.
In 2017, another research[10] has been conducted with the aim of sketching how
security engineering is performed within different kind of Software Development
Lifecycle (SDLC) (more about the topic in the next section 2.1.1). For the purposes
of this paper, the most relevant extracted insight is that the 42% of the 118 analyzed
primary studies concentrate security controls in code phase, relying merely on static
and dynamic analysis on top of the written code. Once again, this proves the grade
of inefficiency regarding the real implementation of security engineering.
In the next sections, a description of the fundamental principles for agile security
engineering are explained. The aim of this chapter is create a solid background for
the following chapters, that will have to refer to the notions explained here.
2.1.1 The Software Development Lifecycle in Agile
As well resumed by Nayan B. Ruparelia in his paper[11], different models can be
adopted as guidance for developing code within a team. New approaches have been
proposed during the years, many others have been rediscussed and improved. The so
called Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) usually defines different stages of the
development and how to go through them. The first documented SDLC has been
the Waterfall Model [12]: even if it has been widely adopted since its publication,
the model nowadays is almost neglected. The Waterfall method is too rigid and
doesn’t provide the possibility to make changes in the design. Development steps
are followed in a row, completely omitting on-going discussions and adaptations of
the project together with the stakeholders. Regarding Waterfall approach, Ericsson
AB in Sweden was taken as test case in 2009 for studying the methodology. The
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resulting paper[13] evidenced all weaknesses and reasons why such method cannot
be considered as effective in software development anymore.
Eventually, many other methods have been released after this one: B-model, In-
cremental model and V-model are some good examples[11]. The central idea intro-
duced with those is the concept of cycling through stages, leveraging the importance
of dynamic definition of the goals in the short term. This approach has been the key
that enables organizations to solve problems of the previously adopted Waterfall-like
methods. Development is split in many sprints that usually last no more than 3-4
weeks. Even if they may slightly vary, all these cycle-based approaches follow five
basic phases within each sprint:
• Requirements: user stories are generated and translated into features to be
implemented;
• Design/Plan: upcoming features to be developed are selected and discussed;
goals are split in small tasks and prioritized;
• Develop/Code: tasks are accomplished;
• Test: fresh new features are stressed in order to detect possible problem-
s/flaws;
• Deploy: developed features are tested and integrated into the product.
In fact, all the Agile techniques mentioned in section 2.1 are compliant with this
philosophy.
2.1.2 The Shift Left paradigm
Differences between teams always leads to interesting insights if seen from the cor-
rect perspective: in the Accelerate annual State of DevOps 2019 report[14], many
different teams has been taken into account thanks to more than 1000 respondents.
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The report divides teams into four main groups, from elite performers towards the
low ones. Thus, the comparison between elite and low performers shows that the
best ones have 7 times lower change failure rate. What is really relevant from this
information is the adopted process before a change: elite groups are not necessary
less error prone than the low ones, but have the capability to capture possible point
of failure before than the others, avoiding to silently carry the errors until the de-
ployment. This is the main key ability that stands behind the shift left paradigm:
addressing issues (including security related ones) towards the early stages of the
SDLC (discussed in section 2.1.1).
In support of the above, the Error cost escalation analysis through the project life
cycle, by NASA[15] in 2004. Taking into consideration three different methods of
analysis and comparing them with previous accomplished studies in the subject, the
study clearly demonstrates that the cost escalation has an exponential growing trend.
The representative outcome of the paper can be identified in the multiplicative
factors shown in table 2.1. Software and electronics hardware (system) projects
have been compared, showing that despite the apparent misalignment of results, the
order of magnitude of growth does not change.
Therefore there is no doubt that waiting for validation coming from the test-
ing phase is already too late, generating a greater required effort in solving the
issue. Even if performing security controls sounds like something to be performed
in the late steps of the development, ensuring information security can gain from
the shift left principle as well. Each stage of the lifecycle requires different approach
(as discussed in chapter 3), which needs to go hand in hand with usual software
development process.
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Software Cost Factors Systems Cost Factors
Requirements 1X 1X
Design 5-7X 3-8X
Build 10-26X 7-16X
Test 50-177X 21-78X
Operations 100-1000X 29-1615X
Table 2.1: Comparison of software & systems error cost factors by NASA study[15].
2.2 Serverless
Even if the usage of Serverless configurations is rooted in 1995, the diffusion and
improvement has grown constantly among decades until today. In the first com-
plete publication[16] about the topic, released by University of Berkeley, the authors
managed to craft the first working configuration of a serverless solution combining
different technologies such as RAID, LFS and Zebra.
During the years, system architectures has grown, pushing further the potential
of the technology itself and, at the same time, overcoming bottlenecks of centralized
file system design. Serverless is just the last stage of a process which has started with
old non-virtualized servers, passing through the event of hypervisor [17] for virtual-
ization and docker 1 for containers. The general tendency of shifting to Platform as a
Service (PaaS) concept influx on the success of Serverless adoption, which nowadays
is able to offer scalability, high availability and the easiest management ever reached
until now.
Eventually, the most advanced stage of server configuration has been reached
during the last years with the cooperation of container technology combined with
Serverless architecture, giving rise to the container-based microservice system, dis-
1https://www.docker.com/
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cussed more in detail in chapter 2.3.
2.2.1 Advantages
The success of the technology relies on few but fundamental points of strength that
allow many "agile" realities (from the smaller start-up to the biggest enterprise) to
enhance the effectiveness of fast pace development discussed in section 2.1.
The most tangible effect for the company that uses the service is the complete
disappearance of low-level server management. The provider of the serverless
solution takes charge in all the responsibility, usually offering an User Interface (UI)
where to customize and setup the required configuration. In addition, monitoring
tools for the service are completely focused on information regarding the service itself
rather than the hardware that actually is running it and its architecture. Access
control alerts, error messages and traffic analysis are good instances of what would
be shown as metrics, taking the place of CPU and memory consumption.
Withstanding service requests is the basis of reliability, therefore the ability
to scale seamlessly and automatically is one of the main reasons of the wide
adoption of serverless solutions. The cost and the difficulty of handling manually
a reasonable level of scalability is already enough to justify the adoption. Service
providers are able to adjust dedicated resources with respect to the load of the
service, relieving engineers of the onerous task of managing resources.
Providers of the service are always able to offer to their customers an high avail-
ability by design: dynamic allocation of resources requires relying on a complex
distributed system of redundant machines that is able to continue operating also in
deteriorated situations.
In business terms, companies who decided to adopt a serverless solution may end
up in saving costs, since the service is supplied with a bill-per-request model. It
is fair to point out that this favourable condition may not always be met as it is
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dependent on the load of requests. Small and medium companies may gain the most
from these agreement, big enterprises may prefer to invest resources to handle their
own infrastructure internally.
2.2.2 Disadvantages
Even if advantages are usually in favour of every possible scenario that can take into
consideration such architecture, some drawbacks can be identified as well.
The vendor lock-in phenomenon is the biggest concern for companies who sign
contracts with service providers. Once the service has been configured it may be
really difficult to migrate into another provider because of technical and businesses
aspects. The shift would require a massive adaption that could be evaluated to be
more expensive than the gains generated by the shift itself. Moreover, each service
provider offers their own small services that are well integrated with one another,
discouraging the adoption of third party services and implicitly pushing the customer
to rely on a single master vendor.
Related to this, customers will necessarily end up in losing control over the
environment and the underlying infrastructure. Exposing the customer to disas-
ters which may happen to the vendor such as exposed vulnerabilities resulting in
security breaches or power outages generated from natural disasters.
2.3 Microservices
A microservice can be defined as a small application that can be tested and deployed
independently, as well as scale to satisfy the demand load. The most important
principle to keep in mind is the single responsibility one, which imposes that
each microservice must provide a simple, defined and atomic service. As stated
by Johannes Thönes in his interview published by IEEE Computer Society[18], mi-
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croservices approach goes against the old-fashion monolithic systems: rather then
include all features of a product into a massive single piece of code, microservices
are aiming for splitting applications into smaller pieces. Each single fragment of
the application is separately maintained but, at the same time, is able to cooperate
together with the other components and, when not needed anymore, it can be easily
shut down. On the same line as Thönes’ words, also the Newman’s book "Building
Microservices"[19] states microservices method allows to make fast changes, which
translate into faster deployments as well. Continuous Integration and Deployment
(CI/CD) (described in section 2.4.2) represents a natural solution to enhance the
potential of microservices, resulting in a more effective software delivery into pro-
duction. In monolithic application, small changes need to be released together with
the whole application. These kind of deployments are risky, therefore they cannot be
performed every now and then. Increasing time in between one release and another
increase the possibilities of incurring in errors. On the other hand, microservices
permit handling possible errors without risking too much, thanks to the isolation
between different services and the simplicity of rolling back to the previous version
if needed.
It is difficult to efficiently scale a monolithic application since it has to be seen as
a single piece that requires a certain amount of resources. Splitting services allows
the usage of less powerful hardware and, even more importantly, to instantiate the
amount of resources on demand. Either organizational alignment can benefit of the
same idea: develop and maintain many small products reflects also in having smaller
and more productive teams.
Even if it can be understood as simple, defining granularity of the services is not
a trivial task: usually each service should stay within 2000 lines of code, but 200
lines could be more than enough. Since this definition may depend on too many
factors, a better definition has been provided by Jon Eaves[19], which uses time
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required to write from scratch the service as a metric, estimating two weeks as a
correct period in which a service should take to be completely reinvented.
Since each service is decoupled one from another, it is possible to maintain a
high level of technology heterogeneity: in other words, tools and languages can
be decided depending on the specific needs of each service, helping in maintain-
ing a lightweight stack and increasing performance. Moreover, this encourages the
adoption of new technologies since those can be tested without big changes in the
overall architecture. In a monolithic system, the substitution of each single compo-
nent would require excessive effort and an high risk task to be performed, therefore
discouraging developers to upgrade the system in favour of newer and better com-
ponents.
The complete picture of microservices is obtained thanks to the creation of an
effective network communication. Each single piece should be autonomous, ex-
posing itself to the other nodes through simple Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs). Citing Newman’s book[19], an effective and simple question to point out in
order to understand if a service is autonomous would be:
"Can you make a change to a service and deploy it by itself without
changing anything else?"
Usually, if the answer is yes a good design has been performed.
As all innovative technologies, microservices introduced challenges together with
improvements discussed since now. Even if it is true that as the service granularity
gets smaller the benefits increase, it is also reasonable that the amount of connected
pieces increase the complexity. Spreading responsibilities into smaller components
increase the difficulty of enforcing security measures against the overall application.
Because of the heterogeneity of the services, an administrator will have to deal
with different security domains, depending on tools and environments in use in each
node. This exposes a greater surface of attack, requiring particular attention in the
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definition of each single exposure point provided by APIs. It is also important to
notice that with such an architecture, introducing the concept of trust is needed:
if one component becomes infected and/or controlled by a malicious party, it can
easily turn into a vector useful for compromising the entire application.
Concluding with another quote from the above-mentioned book[19]:
"As you get better at handling the complexity, you can strive for smaller
and smaller services."
In the next paragraphs, containers and their orchestration will be described.
Those elements can perfectly represent the practical and tangible representation of
the concepts delivered by microservices design.
2.3.1 Containers - Docker
Despite their novelty, containers have been considered from the very beginning as
a powerful solution to solve a lot of technological challenges. Released in March
2013, Docker project is de facto implementation of containers. Thus, from now
on, containers will be considered as Docker images and vice versa. The potential
of Docker has been highlighted already in 2014, when Dirk Merkel wrote about
the topic in the Linux Journal[20]. A lot of limits imposed by the usage of virtual
machines have been pushed far away thanks to this technology: cloud computing
is one of these fields, where the advantages have been promptly emphasized in the
study made by Di Liu and Libin Zhao[21] already in the late 2014.
The official documentation[22] provided by the company itself is accurate and
useful to understand the architectural implementation. Docker provides OS-level
virtualization and is running as a system daemon that acts as an interface between
the instantiated containers and the client that sends commands to the processes. The
aim of a container is to sandbox a process. The container itself is a single process
nested in the host machine kernel. The container itself can be considered as alive
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Figure 2.1: Architectural difference between VMs and containers[21].
as long as the relative process is running. The difference between a container and
a virtual machine (VM) is as simple as effective: each single VM is a virtualization
of a guest Operating System (OS), with its own kernel running; on the other hand,
the strength of containers is the usage of the host machine kernel. The result is a
single process which shares system libraries with the host machine but that at the
same time is enclosed into a single process. Differences in the architecture can be
seen in figure 2.1.
A container image is the binary representation of the container itself and is
nothing more than a composition of different other images, organized in a hierarchi-
cal manner. Each image is a standalone and can be modified, updated and changed.
If one image of the tree has been modified, all the relative descendants of that node
can be rebuilt in order to adopt the latest changes.
Building a container image can be accomplished in two different ways:
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• The Dockerfile is a .json or .yaml file which describes the image itself. The
FROM field defines the parent image where to start and the rest of the file
describes additions made to the parent.
• A docker image can be also build from runtime: it is possible to run the
parent image, make changes and configurations to it and then generate a
replicable image out of that specific execution.
Usually, Docker images are collected into registries. For instance, the Docker
Hub2 is the public one provided by Docker but it is possible to create also private
registries where to store private images. This can be the use case for companies
which don’t want to share their own developed containers. The Docker Host is
considered as the machine in which the daemon and containers are running. Images
can be pulled and pushed from the registry and stored into the docker host cache
registry.
The client manages the life cycle of the containers, interacting with the daemon.
The client can:
• Push and pull images from the cache;
• Create new images;
• Build an image;
• Run an image;
• Configure the infrastructure of the docker host in which containers are oper-
ating, which means network and storage configurations.
Figure 2.2 helps the reader to visualize how the entities described before are related
between each other.
2https://hub.docker.com/
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Figure 2.2: Docker host overall architecture[22].
There are no dependencies between the container and the host machine other
than the daemon: everything is packed into the container itself: because of this,
once a valid daemon can be installed in a machine, every container can run on top
of it, independently from the host machine OS. This independence is based on two
principles:
• Process namespaces provide isolation between different processes, limiting
processes that a container can see, therefore limiting also the usage of those;
• cgroups (control groups) aim is to discipline how much a container can use a
specific resource. Metering and limiting resources such as memory, CPU and
network is the aim, providing also access control over devices.
2.3.2 Container orchestration - Kubernetes
Container orchestration is the next step that enables the concept of containers to
enhance their potential. Even if containers can communicate between each other
without being included in a cluster, these are not specifically designed to accomplish
this task. It is important to notice that container clustering solutions can address
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the majority of the security-related problems that have been discovered regarding
possible attacks. In support of this statement, Docker has been analyzed[23] in 2016
in order to find possible conceptual security weaknesses: the authors of the research
stated that container orchestration tools can solve all the discovered threats.
Google started a project written in Go, called Kubernetes (often shorten as K8s),
which than has been donated in open source to Cloud Native Computing Foundation
(CNCF). Similarly to Docker, Kubernetes quickly assumed the role of the standard
tool used for the purpose. Kubernetes technology is almost in all companies and or-
ganizations who decided to use microservices: in 2018, TheNewStack.io3 conducted
an investigation[24] discovering that Kubernetes was adopted in the 69% of orga-
nizations with microservices architecture. Moreover, the following positions in the
ranking were occupied by Kubernetes wrappers such as Amazon ECS or Google
Container Engine. For this reason, as for the containers, this study will refer to
Kubernetes as the container orchestrator and viceversa.
The term "orchestration" stands for the ability to organize and coordinate ef-
ficiently multiple small services provided via container technology. As explained
in the official online documentation[25] and shown in figure 2.3, a cluster contains
basically three actors:
• The Master (usually single, but for complex configurations may also be more
then one) is the element which coordinates the work in between nodes and it
should be free of normal workload and completely dedicated to receive requests,
schedule tasks to assign to nodes and handle shared resources;
• Nodes handle the workload and execute tasks assigned by the master ;
• A Pod is the atomic unit of Kubernetes. It is always contained inside a
node. Pods include container(s) and provide to those a shared sandboxed
3https://thenewstack.io
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Figure 2.3: Kubernetes architecture[25].
environment in which to operate. Pods do not have a state and they follow
a simple lifecycle where they born, live and then die when they have served
their purpose; they can be easily replicated and included into a ReplicaSet,
which is a collection of different instances of the same pod;
• A service is the element that provide a unique IP/DNS for a group of pods
that are working together. Services and pods are coupled thanks to a simple
and effective labelling system: pods are described with a set of labels (ver-
sion, purpose, environment, ...). A service is defined through a set of labels
as well, which are used to claim the belonging of such pods who match its
categorization;
• A Kubernetes deployment has to be intended as a self-documented declara-
tion of the cluster structure which is intended to be created and maintained
during runtime; it is defined with a manifest file (either .json or .yaml); the
most important element specified into this file is the number of ReplicaSets to
be maintained as active during the execution.
The capabilities of this architecture permits Kubernetes to be considered as one
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of the optimal solutions in terms of scalability.
2.3.3 DIE paradigm
The simplicity of a pod lifecycle is in line with the DIE paradigm. The short lifespan
allows the orchestrator to handle more easily its atomic units, spawning or killing
instances depending on the workload. Furthermore, as soon as the pod reach an
error state or, for some reason, it gets stack, Kubernetes is able to detect the faulty
state and proceed with killing the single unit.
Each pod is coupled to the specific release of the software with which it was
created and there is no way to update or change it. This concept of immutable
software wants to enforce the idea that none of the pods should have a long fixed
life. Whatever is the patch, update or error that has to be handle, the solution
would always be to kill and create a brand new instance with changes up from the
very beginning. Being in line with this idea should push developers and DevOps to
bear in mind that the service should be as lean and clean as possible, with specific
and well circumscribed responsibility.
2.3.4 Distroless containers
By their design, containers should provide a lightweight solution to run code. As
already discussed, each container is based on a base image specified in the FROM
section of the Dockerfile. Although slim Linux distribution (such as Alpine Linux 4
or Debian5) are used as baseline for deploying a service, still a lot of unused and
unnecessary dependencies are introduced. Those dependencies usually are deployed
together with the application that the container is supposed to provide, inevitably
increasing the size of the image and, even more importantly, opening the side to
4https://alpinelinux.org/
5https://hub.docker.com/_/debian
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possible attack vectors.
Google aimed to address such problem introducing a new concept of Distroless
docker images[26]. The pioneering project aims to reduce the content of the final
deployed image to the application itself, the associated resources and the minimum
amount of language-related dependencies needed at runtime. Thus, the eligible
attack surface exposed will be reduced, as well as the size of the image. As a
side-effect, also the overhead needed to scan and patching vulnerabilities related to
unused dependencies will be cut down.
In addition, this compression offers the chance to developers to try to provide
a read-only image whenever possible; getting rid of shell access is also feasible,
reducing again the attack surface. Even without a shell, debugging the image will
be possible through the usage of multi-stage builds [27]: Docker has introduced such
feature in order to help the optimization of images. Before this feature, developers
who were aiming to deploy small images usually had to work with a big container
with all kind of needed dependencies and tools for developing. Once the image was
ready for deployment, a new tiny image was crafted, trying to reduce the content
to a minimum. With the introduction of multi-stage builds, developers are able to
avoid the use of two different images simply using multiple FROM statements in the
image manifest file and giving the possibility to pick one version at build time.
In a big picture such as a Kubernetes cluster, where a lot of pods need to be
instantiated and where connection between them may represent the biggest security
concern, distroless containers represents one of the best and most effective mitiga-
tions against possible attacks.
2.4 Release Management
The integration of brand new features and patches into the final product is a vital
topic that each organization needs to take into account. Despite each company may
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decide to adapt the releasing process with respect to their specific needs, keeping
trace and versioning a product is an essential activity which has be agreed within
the entire team.
Release management follows the entire development of a software build through
its planning, scheduling and controlling phases, until hitting the release. Usually
software is deployed across different environments in order to be tested and then,
consequently, pushed into production. In a context in which Agile methodologies
(discussed in section 2.1) are embraced, techniques for establishing some level of
automation whenever a new feature is ready to be tested has been created.
These will be the topics described in this section, always keeping attention on a
security perspective and its real applicability within the deployment process.
2.4.1 Deployment environments
Whenever a product needs to be delivered and maintained to the customer, an or-
ganization needs to mitigate the risk of producing unexpected disruptions of the
provided service. Developing new features or patching problems is a high risk op-
eration to be directly performed on the customer product. For this reason it is
important to add some layers in between the developer machine, where the features
are tested in the first place, and the machine which actually serves the customer’s
product. Therefore, creating a separation in between a development environment
(DEV ) and production one (PROD) is necessary. This separation allows developers
to deliver and observe new features in a not exposed replica of the product and then,
release or roll back the code depending on the outcome of the tests. The usage of
many other intermediate steps in between DEV and PROD can be adopted in order
to increase the pace of released features together and reducing at the same time the
risk of production failure.
Even though the configuration of such an infrastructure may appear to be com-
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plex to configure and maintain, nowadays Serverless solutions (described in 2.2)
integrate such functionalities into their products. Thanks to this level of simplifi-
cation, it is quite easy for DevOps to handle permission, resources and fine-tuned
configurations through a simple control panel, leaving aside practical hardware issues
and focusing on the logic.
There is a quite large grade of variation in nomenclature that each organization
uses to apply to different environments in use. For this reason, in the following
description of the main environments that usually are used within organization, the
reader is invited to focus on the purpose of each environment rather than on the
assigned name.
• Development environment (DEV): Usually developers use to work lo-
cally in their machine while implementing a new feature or a patch. As soon
as the code seems to be mature enough, the next step is integrating this into
the development environment. This environment contains all the newer im-
plementation of the product but is highly failure-prone due to immaturity of
the code. For this reason, disruption occurs often in DEV, but that doesn’t
represent a problem since this is the real purpose of this environment: provide
an early test bench were to push changes without concerning too much about
possible side effects.
• Stage environment (STAGE): This layer is often renamed as Integration
environment. This version of the product is the collection of all the new
features that have been tested singularly in DEV and that have been considered
to be mature enough to be merged into the master branch. Therefore, in
STAGE all the services and features are labeled as the latest version. The
outcome of this environment may be still unstable due to the integration of
all the new different features.
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• Quality Assurance environment (QA): Whenever the organization de-
cides to release a new update of the product, the current status obtained in
the STAGE is assigned to a tag that express the version of the release. This
specific frame of the product is supposed to be ready for being shipped into
production. Thus, organizations may want to introduce an additional step
in order to run more tests. This is the purpose of the QA, where a release
candidate is produced and submitted to the testing team in order to assess
that all the functionalities included in the release are guaranteed.
• Production environment (PROD): The product which is directly in use
by the customers is the one contained in PROD. Since this is the real-life
exposed version of the product, robustness is required and therefore releases
represent a really sensitive step to be accomplished. Deploying errors or bugs
exposes the organization to huge risks in terms of credibility and finance.
When major releases are deployed, traffic routing may be required in order
to switch from a version to the next one in order to avoid service downtime.
Once again, Serverless solutions simplify such process, often offering automatic
shifting processes. Big companies with enormous amount of users choose to
restrict the release of the new version only to a small fraction of users in order
to mitigate possible errors in the delivered version or even to collect feedback
from users. As described in the "Continuous Delivery" book by J.Humble and
D. Farley[28], this technique - called canary releasing - leads to good benefits:
rolling back to the previous version would be much easier and observing how
and how much the new developed features are used can also give a direction
for future developments. Moreover, this method is considered to be really
effective for testing capacity requirements, releasing the new version gradually
to users.
The pace of the deployments, whether for STAGE, QA or PROD environments,
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is related to the organization decisions. For internal stages, decisions are instructed
by the team organization and the adopted development method, whether for public
releases (and release candidates) it may be effective to take into consideration the
nature of the product itself and the kind of user needs and priorities.
2.4.2 Continuous integration & continuous deployment
In the general Agile and fast development panorama (discussed in section 2.1),
CI/CD plays an important role. The combination of these two processes enables
a company to deliver a more complete and safer product with faster pace. More-
over, it releases developers from manual and inefficient tasks. CI/CD is supposed to
follow the evolution of the code all along the different environments (considered in
section 2.4.1), speeding up the entire process and, therefore, hitting the production
deploy as soon as possible. If in the Accelerate 2019 Report[14] the conjunction
of Development and Operation has been evaluated to be the game changer in soft-
ware development, CI/CD represents the higher point of contact between these two
worlds.
Already in 2017, the Systematic Literature Review conducted by M. Shahin[29]
was highlighting the increase in interest in the topic. The paper took into account
69 papers published from 2004 to 2016, and the 56,5% of those were published
in the previous three years. The growing trend has been discussed in section 5.4,
confirming the importance of this practices. Shahin[29] identified seven main factors
that impact the success of CI/CD, which are:
• Testing (effort and time)
• Team awareness and transparency
• Good design principles
• Customer
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• Highly skilled and motivated team
• Application domain
• Appropriate infrastructure
Such factors will be emphasized in the next paragraphs, where a definition of
Continuous Integration and Deployment is provided. It is important to define bound-
aries of these two methods that always work in symbiosis, but which too often are
erroneously considered as the same thing. In support of these, some space will be
dedicated to Pipelines, as the most used and effective tool.
Continuous Integration (CI)
In the traditional old fashion workflow, developers use to work on their own features
for a long time. If everything goes smoothly, they start to think about integrating
their feature after one or two weeks, even though there is the possibility that the
isolation period can be also extended for a month, depending on the entity of the
developed feature. When the feature is completed, the developer is called to merge
the brand new feature into the master branch of the project. Unfortunately, going
into this process will be so stressful due to the multitude of conflicts that the devel-
oper will have to solve before accomplishing the task. Moreover, the developer will
also have to involve other colleagues to resolve the "merge hell", since he will have
to deal with someone else’s work, avoiding to break what as been done so far. As it
might be evident, such process is time-consuming, stressful and expensive, as well
as error prone. Developers need to probably deal with old code with a logic that
they are missing.
Introduced by Kent Beck in 2000[30], Continuous Integration aims to mitigate
such problem thanks to the fast pace of code growth. As indicated in picture 2.4
focus of CI is on the first step of the programming lifecycle, covering the important
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Figure 2.4: CI/CD integration in the code lifecycle[28].
step that goes from the coding phase to the build. The key concept is quite easy as it
is effective: frequent integration of the code allows developers to work on an updated
code base, therefore drastically reducing the likelihood of conflicts. This won’t
totally prevent clashes, but it will surely reduce the number and, most importantly,
the complexity of the required fix. Less developers will be involved in the case and
probably they will also have to concentrate on small snippets of code which have
been written recently (probably within one or two days). This pattern is in line
with the Beck’s mantra, which states:
"If it hurts, do it often and it will hurt less."
The CI principle is not only aiming to integrate the code, but it is also focused
on the automation of building and testing new commits. Using pipelines (described
in 2.4.3) to automate the build will enable the developer to get notifications just in
case something went wrong and, eventually, quickly fixing the problem. Moreover,
constantly having an updated and working version of the software will open more
possibilities for testing team to accomplish their task more efficiently.
Continuous Deployment (CD)
If the CI is focused on the early stage of the code lifecycle, Continuous deployment
wants to follow the rest of the chain. The goal is to push as quickly as possible the
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code into production through small and frequent changes. Perfectly following the
first principle of the Agile Manifesto[4], CD wants to satisfy customer through early
and continuous delivery of valuable software.
If the first step of the process is covered by CI, which translates code into software
with the build, CD wants to push the software into different steps represented by
the environments to finally hit the production. Different tools may be used in order
to automate the deployment of the software through the different stages, even if
the purpose is always to describe and carry out movements of the build across
environments. Order of deploy, timing a versioning/tagging need to be discussed
within the organization and then translated into a real configuration for such auto
deploy tools.
Lastly, depending on the organization and its nature, decision making can be
required when in comes to release new versions in production. As already mention in
section 2.4.1, companies may target the production release as a risky step that needs
to be evaluated each time a specific version is ready to be deployed. Some companies
refer to their Change Approval Board (CAB) to take decisions. Surprisingly, CD
acronym is sometimes overloaded: when the decision step is required, continuous
delivery terminology should be used rather than deployment. Unfortunately, often
both of this nomenclatures are associated with the same abbreviation, confusing
relative concepts as well.
It is important to notice that opting for Continuous Delivery may be the de-
terrent used to hide the fear of adopting a complete Continuous Deployment ethic.
As stated in the Humble’s book[28], sometimes fear takes over rational decisions,
leading project managers to the feeling of losing the control over what is delivered
to the customer. Even though this may sound reasonable, it is also true that the
risk is tremendously lowered by the minimum amount of change that each small re-
lease will bring. Furthermore, as discussed in section 2.4.1, Canary releases enable
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restricting potential damages as well as collecting data on how customer perceived
the newer updates.
A great instance of successful continuous delivery implementation is the Paddy
Power[31]’s one that L. Chen described. The organization went into a massive shift
during 2014 from traditional software development model into a more automated
reality. At that time, the company counted 4000 employees in the technology de-
partment, with teams composed by two up to 26 developers, depending on the entity
of the project. Before the big change, the company used to release just 6 version
of the software during one year. After the shift, Chen noticed the increase in the
quality of the delivered product, obviously related to the boost in customer satis-
faction: getting frequent updates drive the customer to a better overall perception
of the product and stimulate also to provide feedback that can be implemented and
released fast. It is a virtuous cycle that leads to success. Chen pointed out also
challenges that have been introduced by the shift: the most important one has been
identified as the breakage of barriers between teams and the conceptual adoption of
real collaborative work. Organizational challenges are the part of the transaction
that may require more effort and time to be defined. Lastly, but not less important,
a technical dare has been the creation of a common workflow to put in place CD;
there are no standards and this consumes resources in order to pick the correct tools
and best practices to be adopted.
As for CI, pipelines represent the best mechanism to enable autonomous deploy-
ments.
2.4.3 Pipelines
As stated before, pipelines are the backbone of every kind of continuous framework.
Pipelines are the definition of all those automatic steps that need to be accom-
plished with respect to the CI/CD policies that the team have decided. In other
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words, pipelines can be considered as a executable specification of the tasks that an
engineer would have to accomplish manually right after the coding period. These
specifications are usually split into four consequent steps, where each of them may
contains different tasks in turn:
• Source: this is the pipeline entrypoint, usually fired with a source commit
made by the developer. It can also be fired manually or scheduled, but it is
quite uncommon. Usually this step is not explicitly defined since its unique
goal is to start the rest of the operations chain;
• Build: source code needs to be combined with dependencies in order to create
the executable software. This step may be skipped in case the language in use
is an interpreted one (such as Python, Javascript, Ruby etc.) but it is necessary
for all the ones that need to be compiled, such as Go, C, C++, Java and many
other. It is particularly important to notice that, in a microservice context,
this step is always required independently from the programming language,
since the container requires to be built;
• Test: as soon as a runnable instance of the source code has been produced,
the software itself can be tested in order to verify its correctness and expected
behaviours. Tests to be run against the build are written by the developers,
and may differ in typology. The biggest distinction is between unit tests and
integration tests ; the first one is focused on testing a the smaller feature of the
software, which should be the more atomic and simple as possible; on the other
hand, integration tests or end-to-end tests are made from a user perspective,
testing multiple consequent interactions with the software that can be made
by a user to consume a specific feature. It is important to notice that writing
and running more test means to have a more reliable code, even if this phase
may take quite a lot of time. In order to mitigate this slow down, a team may
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want to execute tests just in one of the environments or reduce the number of
assessments in the early stages;
• Deploy: actions performed in this phase really depend a lot from the environ-
ment and from the policies that have been decided by the team/organization.
It is easy to understand that deploy features in DEV environment can be done
without risking compared to deploying in production. The tendency is to au-
tomatically fire this phase in the first steps of the deployment and fire this
phase manually for production deployment.
Whenever a single task contained in one of the previously described steps fails,
all the pipeline stops generating a notification. At this point it will be easier for
the developer to check and solve the error, since the modification that produced the
failure has been made recently. As soon as the problem is solved, the developer can
commit again and a new pipeline will be fired. Whatever pipeline tool is in use, it
should always provide logs and tracebacks of what has been done so far and error
messages that generate the failure state, so that the developer will easily locate the
source of the problem.
3 Security best practices in software
development
This chapter attempts to frame the current state of the art regarding security pro-
cesses and their integration in the normal software development flow. Such best
practices, taken from literature and from the the most virtuous contexts, represents
the starting point for the investigation aims of this study.
Security cannot be taken into account as an additional phase of the normal
development, where all checks and verification are applied in order to certify the
robustness of the final product: on the contrary, security lays on all different steps
of the development adopting different approaches to reach the highest level of effec-
tiveness. It is important to keep in mind the importance of the shift-left paradigm
(discussed in section 2.1.2), without losing the focus from the last phases of the
process.
In the next sections, current methods defined as the best approaches are grouped
by the main phases in which those belong to. Starting from the planning phase,
where measures are defined at an higher level, methods become more technical for
code, build and test phases.
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Figure 3.1: DevOps cycle proposed by Jim Bird[32].
3.1 Secure Software Development Lifecycle
A great overview is provided by the concept of Continuous Security that Jim Bird
tried to frame into the diagram shown in figure 3.1: security is achieved following
the SDLC steps that have been discussed in 2.1.1, demonstrating again how security
is a central feature.
Even more interesting is the Secure Software Development Lifecycle (SSDLC)
framework openly released by the Unity AppSec Team[33], which provides a more
practical approach. Despite small differences, concepts that rely behind these two
perceptions of security are quite in line. The Unity documentation defines a parallel
lifecycle timeline (shown in figure 3.2) to the usual SDLC one, identifying practices
to adopt in each block of the process. In table 3.1, each stage of the Unity SSDLC
is associated with macro-tasks to be integrated in the normal workflow. The aim is
to leverage security over the development process.
The schema proposed by the UnityTech will be adopted in the following sections
in order to frame and describe measures that nowadays are considered to be the best
practices in infosec. By itself, SSDLC is useless if not associated with an effective set
of tools and processes. In fact, activities listed in table 3.1 are high level activities
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Figure 3.2: Unity SSDLC parallel with respect to normal SDLC[33].
that deserve to be deepened and integrated.
Requirements Design Implementation Test Deploy
Security
Requirements
Design Review
and
Threat Models
Static Analysis
and
Secure Coding
Open discussion
and
Security Testing
Pentesting and
Incident Response
Support
Table 3.1: Unity AppSec Team SSDLC macro activities offering[33].
3.2 Requirements phase
In the earlier stage of a project, the requirements definition needs to evaluate the
boundaries and rules that will be applied during the entire development and shared
high-level guidelines to be compliant with. Elements to be taken into account are law
and specific regulations related to the project topic, even if internal and customer
care policies should be involved as well. On top of the assumptions and decisions
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that are taken during this phase, security requirements should be involved in the
discussion in order to identify standards that need to be observed. The company
should have a security policy already in place that can speed up the process, but ex-
ternal standards are usually interesting to be followed to enhance the security level,
therefore gaining in reliability and trust from customers. Depending on the field,
many security guidelines have been detailed: explicative instances may be repre-
sented by Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regarding
healthcare or Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) standard
for what concerns credit cards. Such information security standards are responsible
for the mitigation of environment-related threats and are mostly associated with
sensitive scopes.
Exception is made for ISO 27000-series standard, which is the most important
general security standard. As such, it deserves to be described more in detail in the
following section.
3.2.1 ISO/IEC 27000-series standard
The aims of the ISO/IEC 27000 standard family target to compensate the lack of
information security in business organizations, whether for small companies or for
big enterprises. Sensitive data is the main actor taken into account, which can be
identified in financial information, customer data, employee details and internal in-
tellectual property. The delivery is a complete framework of practicalities related to
the enhancement of information security measures. As indicated in the name, the
standard has been released and currently maintained by the united effort of Inter-
national Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) organizations.
In particular, the ISO 27000 acts as an introduction and background definition
for the well known ISO 27001 standard. This latter explains in detail requirements
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for an compelling Information Security Management System (ISMS). Having such a
standard helps companies to centralize security controls that may be already imple-
mented within the company infrastructure, but not properly used. The result is an
efficient and complete ISMS, able to systematically check the identified vulnerable
points. As stated by Georg Disterer[34], the ISO 27001 is a signature of reliability
for the company who claim it, since it implies meeting strict requirements. More-
over, the certification comes from a third-party international organization such as
ISO, consequently increasing both the reputation of the subscribed company and
the customer’s faith. In addition, the standard is constantly updated in order to
match with new technologies and their related threats that come along with, push-
ing companies to be keep their infrastructure updated and in line with the latest
guidelines.
It is important to reference the main objectives of the ISO 27001 standard that
Disterer[34] pointed out. Apart from the standard itself, the paper highlight strong
concepts to take into account during the requirement definition such as human re-
sources security or information system acquisition, development and management.
Being compliant with all the requirements can be a tough target to be accomplished
by companies, but even if that is not possible, the standard should be used to pin-
point the major topics and elements in which to focus on in the requirement phase
and, in general, it should always be perceived as a target to hit.
3.3 Design phase
Requirements shape the boundaries of the project, but the foundation of the software
architecture need to be crafted just before to start to implement the product. In fact,
there is no code involved already in this phase since the focus is on the elements that
will be used and how those will be connected together. Even if some decisions may
appear to be straight-forward for designers, this is not replicable at all security-wise
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speaking. For this reason, all design documentation that will be produced should be
reviewed from security perspective and, even more effective, security experts should
be involved in the design process to facilitate decisions and highlight weaknesses that
may go unnoticed. To help in this process, separate sessions can be organized to
review the architecture and find all possible flaws and vulnerabilities of the provided
solution. This discussions are usually named as Threat Modeling (TM) sessions;
high-level frameworks and software tools has been produced during the time to
support such practice, but still today lot of organizations lack in the usage of such
an important practice.
3.3.1 Pre-coding
Before get into the process of writing code, some preventive steps should be done
to design in the best way the code architecture and safe time and effort to solve
problems that, almost certainly, will come out later on.
Third party libraries validation
It is a popular and verified quote which states that there is no need to reinvent the
wheel. Third party libraries are really important for developers because they allow
to speed-up the code creation problem avoiding to spend effort in something that has
been already developed, tested and debugged by someone else. Such libraries’ source
code can be either publicly released as open source resource or private and provided
by the third entity as blackbox software. Security-wise speaking, it is strongly rec-
ommended to prefer the first option, even if the library itself entails a subscription
payment. Whitebox source code is more secure by design, since anyone can access
the codebase, review it and freely start a discussion over possible problems. More-
over, the risk of running code that execute something different with respect to what
is stated by the third entity is canceled. Fortunately, as confirmed by the Snyk in
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its annual report about security in open source[35], the open source expansion is
continuously growing and adopted by almost all the products that nowadays are
leading the software development.
Keeping that in mind, it is also meaningful to check the shape of the repository
and how it is maintained. Accessing the repositories from Github1 is always a good
practice, since a lot of insights can be detected from there. The most important
information to detect is if the library is still actively maintained, and this can be
done inspecting the commit history. Moreover, also the list of issues are important
to detect some possible major problems which have been detected by users and that
are still unresolved. Lastly, it is worth to check the number of contributors that
work behind the project: relying on a library maintained by a single person is not
recommended, since the project could easily be abandoned and is too dependent from
the developer’s willing. It is better to rely on libraries developed and maintained by
relatively big and important teams that can properly support users.
Fail securely
Setup the environment means also to create the possibility for the developer to test
developed features in a protected environment in which there are no big availability
constraints. Testing features also in early stages can speedup the entire process,
whether if this is done in a company development environment (as discussed in
2.4.1) or locally, in the developers’ machine. Therefore, sand-boxing the testing
environment as much as possible is crucial for the development effectiveness and the
security-related concerns as well.
1https://github.com/
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Managing secrets
Hard-coding tokens and passwords in the code, even if just for testing purposes, is
one of the bad habits that most of programmers still commit. Even if for local testing
purposes this can be perceived as a safe operation, at least until the developers
forget about that secret, pushing changes in the repository and therefore exposing
the secret publicly. As evidence of the high frequency of such event occurrence, one
good source of proof is the sshgit live2 website, where fresh new publicly released
usernames, tokens and passwords are collected from new commits on git version
control platforms such as GitHub and GitLab.
Fortunately, tools and platforms to properly handling secrets are available and
represent the best manner how to safely store and access to credentials, tokens and
sensitive files.
When an organization is not able to provide a single solution for secret handling,
employees and developers usually adopt different and risky methods to store cre-
dentials and tokens, most probably exposing the entire system or part of it to huge
dangerous threats. For this reason, the centralization of secrets assumes a key
role. Converging all secrets into a single place helps administrators to build gover-
nance and policies over sensitive information, as well as enabling also the capability
to log and audit access to sensitive information. In that way, also revoking access
to specific resources would be easier and applicable with a better granularity.
One may think that creating a simple database would be enough, but actually
this is not the case: with more sophisticated solutions it is possible to provide
Access control capabilities, enforcing policies that otherwise wouldn’t be used
with a normal database. Thanks to an Access Control List (ACL), both users and
applications are capable of accessing only the relevant information for them.
Another way to increase security with automation is to dynamically rotate
2https://shhgit.darkport.co.uk/
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secrets for every different entity/service. User/application will access the creden-
tials in the same way, but under the hood the secret manager will refresh secrets,
refreshing them and cleaning up once the (short) Time To Live (TTL) of the secret
itself expires. Moreover, since there’s no direct access to the secret itself for the user,
it will be possible to generate strong passwords and at the same time, prevent
reusing those.
When speaking about secrets, it is also important to use encryption in all the
steps, so that the information would be useless even if a leak occurs. In this sense,
encryption as a service allows to safely handle users credentials and, at the same
time, release developers from implementing cryptography by themselves.
3.3.2 Threat modeling
Threat Modeling (TM) is the practice that allows a team to create an abstraction
level of their system consequently is examined to discover flaws exploitable by a
hypothetical malicious user. As mentioned in [36], TM can be disassembled in three
main steps:
1. Asset identification, where the most sensitive services and information are
pinpointed as primary target to be protected;
2. Creation of a system overview picture, clearly placing the assets and
defining the data flow as well as the interconnections between the different
parties of the system;
3. Threat identification on top of the previous step, discovering vulnerabilities
that endanger the assets.
Along the years, multiple frameworks to improve efficiency of TM has been
released: in [37] N. Shevchenko managed to describe the 12 most important ones,
while in [36] a bigger analysis was conducted, taking into account 26 methods. This
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proliferation is dependent from small changes that during the time had been made
to the main frameworks. Even though the most relevant methods can be reduced to
few of them, having such a big pool is still worth since the method should be adopted
with respect to many factors. This should push teams to analyze their systems from
different perspective with respect to their specific needs and the purpose of the
product itself. The available amount of time, the experience of the team, the level
of engagement of the stakeholders or the targeted focus (security, privacy, risk) are
just some examples of considerations that may influence the decision of the most
appropriate methodology.
As remarked in [37], the common advice is to organize the TM session as early as
possible in the development process. Be proactive, in this sense, while architectural
decision are still under discussion, as stated in section 2.1.2, reduces the number
and even the impact of all possible threats that may come up.
For the scope of this thesis, there is no meaning to go through all the main meth-
ods adopted by organizations but mentioning STRIDE as the most widely adopted
can be useful to understand how a TM framework can be structured. Therefore, also
TRIM is taken into account because of its different aim with respect to STRIDE:
useful instance of different point of views that a team may want to stick with de-
pending on the specific needs. Following this kind of a guidance, the team won’t
forget to cover all different main aspects to be protected within a system.
Data Flow Diagram
Data Flow Diagram (DFD) plays an essential role in the TM, representing the
most important element where to base all the following assumptions and observa-
tions regarding security. Not only STRIDE-based methods require such an artifact,
but lot of other famous TM methods such as LINDDUN (Linkability, Identifiabil-
ity, Non-repudiation, Detectability, Disclosure of information, Unawareness, Non-
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compliance)[38] and PASTA (Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis)
(reviewed in [37]) but that are not included in this literature.
The main purpose of DFD is offering an overall picture of the system, creating
at the same time a good layer of abstraction but keeping a sufficient level of details
too. The most important entities that need to be included in the DFD usually are:
• System interactions with external entities,
• Processes,
• Data flows,
• Data stores.
Finding the good ratio between details and abstraction is the most difficult side
of creating an effective DFD. Vulnerabilities often rely on tiny small details that
consequently could be exploited to threat the entire system. Therefore, omitting
security assumptions that have been made while conceiving the system architecture
may mislead the TM session itself. In this regard, a detailed analysis has been
conducted in Belgium in 2018[39]. L. Sion and his team highlighted how much
the lack of security and privacy-related information, as well as for traceability of
accomplished decisions, can badly affect the consequent threat discussion.
The proposed solution aims to enrich the base DFD with all the elements that
can influence, even if slightly, security and privacy aspects of the architecture. The
easiest example is shown in figure 3.3. Drawing 2 entities in communication is
worth and can be easily understood, but labelling such connection with HTTPS
is way more informative for the audience, which consequently can take for granted
that from that connection integrity, confidentiality and destination authentication
are enforced because of TLS.
Despite the basic example, many other assumptions can bring to the table impor-
tant notions to be taken into account: the usage of containers, executing a certain
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Figure 3.3: DFD section representing an HTTPS communication.
service in a sandboxed environment, OS protections applied and encryption are just
few instances that are often used in such a context. These details in the DFD can
significantly speed up the TM session, therefore decreasing the number of false pos-
itive and false negatives. Moreover, this will increase the attendees’ confidence and
consequently, the quality of the analysis itself.
STRIDE
Among all different frameworks and methods taken into account in [37] and [36],
STRIDE can be easily elected as the most frequently adopted and, therefore, the
most mature. For this reason, quite a lot of derivations of this method have been
created during the years. STRIDE was created in 1999 and its popularity started
to grow since 2002, when Microsoft decided to adopt it. As many other techniques,
everything starts from the Data Flow Diagram. The success of the session strongly
depends from this step, since it represents a common baseline of knowledge for all
the attendees of the session used to discover new threats in the second phase. In
this stage, the acronym of the name itself is used as a mnemonic reference to take
into account aspects of the architecture.
Within the name of the technique, the following threats are carried:
• Spoofing : threaten authentication when an attacker claims to be someone or
something else to gain privileges;
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• Tampering with data: disrupt the integrity of information contained in mem-
ory storage;
• Repudiation: break the non-repudiation principle through the possibility of
renouncing any taken action, whether the subject is honest or not;
• Information disclosure: leaking information to entities that shouldn’t have
access to it, breaking the confidentiality principle;
• Denial of Service: causing a service breakage, undermining the availability of
a provided service;
• Elevation of privilege: an entity is able to perform actions which should re-
quire an higher set of privileges with respect to the currently owned, escaping
authorization enforcement.
In support of the acronym itself, checklists and collections of questions have been
written to help highlighting possible vulnerabilities.
This method is usually criticized because its tendency to be time-consuming, as
well as the attitude to generate quite a lot false negative cases.
TRIM
Despite TRIM sharing the general idea with STRIDE, this framework is completely
centered in providing a guideline in order to evaluate privacy concerns. The aim is
to capture possible design mistakes in the system which could undermine personal
data. The concepts delivered with such acronym are all about data handling and
protection:
• Transfer of personal data: confidentiality over the transfer and legal con-
straints;
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• Retention and Removal of personal data: definition of a specific life-cycle for
personal data storage and the possibility to completely delete those;
• Interconnections and Inference: destroying pseudonyms and strong correla-
tions between personal data items;
• Minimisation of personal data: reduce the stored information to the minimal
amount necessary for technical requirements.
Despite some letters are shared with STRIDE, it is easy to notice that these two
methods are quite far from one another, offering a different perspective. It is a good
practise to combine both methods in order to get the best result out of the TM
session.
Threat modelling applicability with Agile
On top of all the considerations that have been done so far, it is clear that threat
modelling has a big relevance within the process of development of whatever project.
Futhermore, integrating such process into the normal Software Development Life-
cycle is a step that needs to be carefully carried out to transform TM into effective
tasks to be accomplished in order to enhance security. As pointed out in [37], TM is
completely applicable with Agile development methodologies[3] and can be adopted
with respect to the sprint timeframes. Despite this compatibility, such integration
is still a delicate step that brings some challenges to be faced. In [36], four differ-
ent Agile-based Norwegian organizations, where TM sessions are part of the SDLC,
have been taken under analysis. The study pointed out the difficulty of perceiving
security as a top priority. Employees were interviewed and what came of can be
summarized in a brief list of challenges that reduce the efficiency and the positive
effects of the TM itself:
1. The lack of motivation is quite common in three out of four companies because
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of the small relevance conferred to security in general;
2. Often employees reported the difficulty in identifying threats, which usually is
derived from the lack of experience or from the decision making required when
an identified threat need to be labelled as relevant or not with respect to the
system context;
3. 75% of companies perceive TM as a time-consuming task, which can be the
reality if the session is not facilitated by some experienced figures and if DFD
is not complete or is even missing at the very beginning of the session;
4. Almost all the interviewees mentioned to have difficulties in the "definition of
done" when it comes to evaluate steps to be accomplished and checkpoints to
consider a threat as completely mitigated.
The investigation carried out by K. Bernsmed and M. G. Jaatun also defined three
of the best practices that influx positively in the TM practices:
1. Even if not particularly relevant for assets definition, developers need to be in-
volved in the TM to bring relevant and practical aspects to the table, maturing
in them a critical spirit with regard to security;
2. The usage of checklists is a simple as effective method to clearly define the
process, simultaneously avoiding wasted time and forgetting discussion points;
3. A regular scheduling of the sessions keeps the team aware, helps to completely
integrate TM into the SDLC and therefore reduces the needed effort per each
session.
Tools
In support of the long list of TM methods, some tools have been developed by big
organizations such as Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) in order to
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be integrated into their processes. Consequently, these have been released to help
other companies to speed up and increase the effectiveness of the sessions. These
utilities don’t have the pretensions of replacing a complete framework, but to support
the latter, making the meetings more dynamic and less heavy. The following list is
a brief collection of the four most widely used proposals:
• OWASP - Threat Dragon
• Microsoft - Threat Modelling
• OWASP - Cornucopia
• Mozilla - Seasponge
Of course, adopting any of these utilities is not required, especially in such teams
where a good level of experience is already achieved. On the other hand, such tools
may help where TM is not a consolidated practice.
3.4 Implementation phase
Developers are the main actors in this step. For this reason, they can also be the
biggest threat: they tend to focus on solving the issue that they have been assigned
to and usually they are pushed to accomplish the task in the fastest way as possible.
Unfortunately, this leaves security in the shadow and that is why it is so important
to invest on the creation of a real sense of security awareness in the developers.
The target to reach for a company is to count on developers to be mature enough
to critically think about the code that has been written and relate it to a possible
threat. For this reason, it is so important for a developer to memorize and digest
the OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities[40], that, as stated by OWASP itself, is
"Globally recognized by developers as the first step towards more secure
coding."
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In this way, this collection of threats won’t be anymore a list to check every time
at the end of a coding session, but instead a collection of concepts unconsciously
and constantly recalled while writing the code.
That being said, still a lot of details and precautions can be take in place to push
further the effectiveness of secure coding.
3.4.1 Coding
In the process of coding, the developer can still take into account some aspects that
can decrease the likelihood of introducing flaws. The first step to write secure code
is studying. Being able to consider threats while coding requires the developer to be
aware about common practicalities and problems that may undermine the security
of the overall project. But on top of that, few more points can be highlighted in
order to further help the developer.
Linters
The usage of linters may help to anticipate security-related problems even before the
code is committed in the repository. Those can also be used to help the developer
to improve his coding style, learning new patterns and techniques to avoid flaws.
Usually such tools can be installed as an extension for common IDEs, allowing
the programming environment itself to provide hints and pinpoint possible flaws in
realtime, while the developer is in the process of writing. Usually a linter is strictly
linked to a specific programming language so that specific language-related problems
can be detected more precisely.
A linter can be defined as a software able to run static analysis of the code,
therefore such tools can be also integrated in the CI/CD pipelines (discussed in
2.4.2) or simply fired before committing the code.
The tool is particularly important when used with a team vision: a linter can
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help to maintain a heterogeneous knowledge within a team. Juniors can see liters
as a senior member that gives guidelines and facilitates the growth process. Seniors
can enforce a consistent style on a team.
Language best practices
To integrate the service that linters are already providing, the developer may want
to go through some documentation that can provide a list of best practices and
practicalities to be adopted while coding with a specific programming language.
In fact syntax, design or constraints of a specific language may open the side to
different problems which usually are well known and can be easily mitigated during
the writing process. The collection of best practices for Go, Node.js, Ruby and C#
provided in the UnityTech SSDLC framework (proposed in 3.1) is a good example
of reference, but many other guidelines provided by referenced authorities such as
OWASP can be found for the most common programming languages.
Sanitization
Lastly, it is important to bear in mind to always verify any kind of input with
sanitization methods, as well as checking the provided outputs. Cross-site Script-
ing (XSS) attacks are one of the most common vulnerabilities since they rely on
programmers negligence and are quite difficult to detect. One single defect may
represent a potential huge risk for the entire system.
3.4.2 HTTP security headers
More often enterprise sales relies on a new sort of benchmark assessing a security
evaluation over a company or a product. For this reason, services that provide
that sort of security scorecards are rising in popularity. Because their relevance is
ramping up, it becomes to be important to understand where their score is based
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on. Based on the scoring methodology[41] applied by Mozilla Observatory3, which
is one of the most famous services in this field, such score is assigned based on two
main factors. IP reputation is one of these: it always refers to blacklists or spam
lists where bad nodes are collected. As far as the company taken into account is not
spamming or frequently affected by malware infections, this factor shouldn’t effect
negatively the overall score.
The second and most relevant factor to really take into account is the HTTP
security headers used during the communication. Since the IP reputation is quite
easy to be achieved, security headers set on public websites determine the majority
of the score outcome. Headers can directly address specific problems, mitigating
different possible threats. Therefore, it is meaningful to group and describe them
by purpose, trying to provide a better understanding about where and how headers
can be relevant for mitigation.
A complete overview about all headers which are related to security is provided
by OWASP in their OWASP Secure Headers Project [42].
Cross-origin Resource Sharing
One of the most powerful features that has revolutionized web applications in general
has been the possibility to link resources to allow communication in between different
parties. Despite the improvements carried out by the feature, such feature opens
the application to many possible attacks. Restrictions over the shared data between
parties are needed, and therefore an origin based security model has been created
in order to regulate communications. Even with the security model put in place,
it is particularly difficult to provide a solution which can fit all possibilities. In
fact, Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) setting are very endpoint dependent.
Despite such preamble, there is still room for general guidance which can be helpful
3Mozilla Observatory online service
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to provide a reasonable usage of CORS headers.
CORS can be considered as a whitelisting tool for Same Origin Policy (SOP)
mechanism. For this reason, the usage of wildcard * is strongly discouraged in allow-
headers (such as Access-Control-Allow-Origin or Access-Control-Allow-Methods).
The only situation in which such header can be used is when a publicly open
app/APIs needs to be served.
Lastly, it is worth to bear in mind that CORS policies completely differ from
measures that can be taken into account for Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
attack mitigation. In fact, SOP may help only when trying to prevent any token to
be read form a different malicious domain, which is not a target of a CSRF attacker.
The attacker’s aim is to let the user perform the malicious request performing a
client-side attack and third party origins are not really involved in such mechanism.
Content Security Policy
The purpose of Content Security Policy (CSP) is to mitigate XSS attacks by re-
stricting resources loaded in the browser. JavaScript, CSS, fonts, images are just
intances of what can be controlled by this header. Each different kind of resource
can be treated in a different way. By default, if not specified in the directive, all
resources are allowed to be loaded. As general guidance, the stricter the directive,
the better it is for security of the web application. Therefore, blocking all the un-
necessary resources specifying the policy as: ’none’ is the preferred choice. It is
still worth to define policy to ’self’ in case the domain has only trusted contents.
Many tools are available for different browsers in order to create CSP drafts and
for checking them as well.
An example of CSP header can be the following:
Content−Secur i ty−Pol i cy : de fau l t−s r c ' s e l f ' ; img−s r c ' s e l f ' ;
ob ject−s r c 'none ' ; s c r i p t−s r c ' s e l f ' ; s t y l e−s r c ' s e l f ' ;
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frame−ance s t o r s ' s e l f ' ; base−u r i ' s e l f ' ; form−ac t i on ' s e l f ' ;
In this case the following directives are enforced:
• Default to only allow content from the current site;
• Do not allow objects such as Flash and Java;
• Only allow images, scripts, styles, frames and forms to submit from the current
site;
• Restrict URL’s in the tag to current site.
Cookies
Cookies are particularly interesting for an attacker in order to achieve unauthorized
access over protected resources. Therefore, is particularly important to enforce some
security constraints over the usage of such powerful but potentially dangerous tool.
In the response headers it is possible to specify policies to be applied with cookies.
The Secure directive is important since it enforces the cookie to be transmitted
exclusively via encrypted connection (HTTPS required).
Whenever possible, it is also strongly recommended to use the HttpOnly directive
to deny the possibility to read the cookie using JavaScript. SameSite directive could
be used to forbid the cookie to be sent via cross-origin requests (assigning Strict
value), or at least to limit it (using Lax ). This feature is particularly useful for
CSRF attack mitigation.
It is also recommended to apply the shortest expiration date as possible and
assigning the some restricted path as well to limit visibility.
Information leakage avoidance
Sometimes also removing some headers may help to restrict attack surface. It is the
case of headers such as Server or X-Powered-By headers, where information about
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the backend software and version are leaked. Usually an attacker aims to know this
information in order to look for possible public vulnerabilities related to the specific
setup in place in the server. Therefore, is recommended to simply avoid to include
this headers in responses.
Cache control
As for useless headers that may leak relevant information for an attacker, cache can
represent a target for an attacker who is willing to retrieve personal information. It
is a good practice to avoid caching pages where sensitive information is contained,
reserving this feature only for static resources such as images, CSS files or similar.
Cache-Control header can be included in the responses to force the client to not use
cache for specific sensitive data. Pragma header has the same purpose and is used
for backwards compatibility with HTTP/1.0 caches.
Don’t roll your own crypto
As general advice, it is always a bad idea to start implementing customized cryp-
tography algorithms since these require an extensive knowledge in mathematics and
need to be tested for long time. Therefore, relying on well-known and up to date
algorithms is the best choice, which reduces development time and increase security.
Moreover, keeping in mind how and why the used protocols have been imple-
mented will help the developer to correctly apply such protocols. Therefore, studying
at least the basic mechanisms behind adopted protocols is strongly suggested.
3.5 Test phase
Now that the code has been committed, fulfilling the previously defined requirements
is needed. Thus, the source needs to be evaluated from different perspective, trying
to fire the highest number of tests that can be accomplished autonomously.
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There is still room for manual testing of the application in this phase, but such
tasks should be limited to few restricted tasks; reviewing logs of automated tests
is one of those; exploratory testing together with manual penetration testing should
be constantly accomplished in order to look for new vulnerabilities and threats may
not have been caught by automatic testing.
Fuzz testing (or fuzzing) is another great way to discover implementation bugs
and possible malformed payloads that may disrupt the target service. This black
box technique aims to automatically detect problems through the generation of
a multitude of requests with randomly generated (and therefore also malformed)
inputs that may have been left uncovered by developers. The technique, firstly
presented in 1989 by Professor Miller from the University of Wisconsin-Madison[43],
nowadays can be performed by many tools that usually are particularly used in
penetration testing. Fuzzing can be considered as a specific kind of test that can
be placed in between manual and automatic testing, since the point of injection for
random data should be carefully and manually identified.
Automation of tests includes different kind of checks. Firstly, it is worth to con-
stantly monitor performance of the resources involved in serving provided services,
either virtual or physical ones. Most probably, resources that are going outside
boundaries of normal consumption are the sentry of problems. Having good notifi-
cation system may avoid brutal attacks such as a Denial of Service.
Ensuring that security standards are also doable with reasonable amount of ef-
fort: analyzing security headers and TLS configuration is an easy and cheap way to
do so.
In the early 2020, it has been reported by the Snyk State of Open Source Se-
curity Report[35] that more than 75% of all code vulnerabilities reside in indirect
dependencies. This should be enough to convince the reader about the importance
of analyzing dependencies that are involved in the application. In this sense, mi-
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croservices may increase complexity since each service is potentially running with a
different programming language and platform. Therefore, it is difficult to identify
a simple solution able to solve these checks. Each organization needs to craft their
own implementation depending on the architecture in place.
Going deeper into the code inspection, smoke tests are an essential element of
this phase. Main functions are reproduced by an automatic tool that is able to
replicate an user that tries to use every single feature that the application offers.
The aim is to certify the correct behaviour of the application with respect to the
provided inputs.
Smoke tests can highlight possible vulnerabilities exploitable from discovered er-
rors, but more specific and security-centered tests can be written as well. Black-box
approach can be used as well to replicate possible behaviours that an attacker would
try to perform in order to penetrate into the application. This testing technique is
called Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) and it may be useful to catch
authentication or session issues, memory leaks or other weaknesses of the system.
This technique tends to produce quite a lot of false positives and it is usually in-
tegrated with a good bug tracking platform to decrease the rate of misdetections.
Moreover, DAST requires to be run in a testing environment where malicious pay-
loads can be pushed without risking corruption of sensitive data.
Static Application Security Testing (SAST) is another kind of investigation which
can be conducted; differently from the previous one, whitebox approach is followed
allowing a security-centered inspection of the source code in order to find specific
dangerous snippets. Those well-known patterns are mostly language dependant,
therefore SAST tools are usually integrated into linters (described in 3.4.1).
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3.6 Deploy phase
A released product includes also assistance to guide the customers and help them
when problems occur. Maintaining a product can be defined in different manners
from assisting end users or feed the developers’ backlog, patching or improving the
project.
The most direct and effective way to predict the future direction of a product is
often considered to be represented by feedback of customers and end users. To do
so, proper methods should be designed in order to process in the best way feedback.
Each suggestion need to be translated into descriptive task(s) for the development
team. The purpose of feedback processing is to close the development cycle, feeding
back the design phase.
As already hinted in 2.4.2 section, it is extremely useful to gather insights about
the usage of the product. Such information can be considered as an implicit feedback
generated by customers that actively use the provided platform.
Insights analysis does not include only statistics over the usage of the platform,
but involves monitoring resources used to provide the service itself as well. It is
usually the DevOps’ prerogative to setup an effective alerting system that can really
help to promptly detect problems that have to be solved as soon as possible. Tra-
ditionally, alerts are delivered to developers and DevOps using email ; despite this
tendency, the raising usage of dedicated instant messaging platforms contributed to
push the development of bots able to directly post alerts into chats. The implemen-
tation of such feature is not complicated itself, since the majority of chats already
come with the possibility of bot integration (whether as native function or through
the usage of third party plugins). Actually, the most difficult part is to fine tune
the occurrences of messages in order to avoid the generation of noise in chats. Thus,
providing too much alerts will increase the likelihood of false positives, therefore
discouraging developers to take seriously such alarms. At the same time, restricting
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too much the triggering range will probably generate false negatives. This respon-
sibility is assigned to DevOps, who have to define a reasonable threshold, as well as
correctly addressing alerts only to the relevant personnel.
The best way to handle incidents that may happen during the lifetime of the
deployed software is to document procedures that should be adopted in such cases.
When an emergency occurs it is difficult to take meditated decisions, therefore it is
desirable to structure procedures with a cool head to speed-up and improve incident
recovery actions.
As stated in [44], the practice of crowdsourcing information security has been
taken more and more popularity within organization. Bug Bounty Programs are one
of the most representative examples of such phenomenon. Organizations may want
to outsource penetration testing of their products to professional testers, offering a
reward in case of discovered and well-reported vulnerability.
Lastly, another good practice for InfoSec figures, developers and DevOps is to
always keep an eye over cybersecurity-related news to be always updated over new
discovered vulnerabilities and zero-days4.
3.7 Retirement
In a future the product that it has been developed will face and end and it will
be retired. Unfortunately, the retirement of a project is not always well treated in
companies and no guidelines are defined. Despite this negligence, implications of
the retirement should be considered and handled in a proper manner. In the worst
scenario, failing to dispose properly the resources that have been used so far may
also lead to information leakages.
That being said, it is important to follow a good migration plan in case a new
4A zero-day vulnerability is a flaw that is unknown or still not mitigated by the vendor of the
software.
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product will take the place of the old one. At the same time, all the collected and
sensible data should be archived properly to avoid leakages and legal implications
related to such information. All resources that are not supposed to be used anymore,
whether physical or virtual ones, should be destroyed. Lastly, it could be also
important to clean up DNS names in order to avoid future collisions or takeovers.
4 Cutting-edge approaches for
secure development
After the analysis made in chapter 3 about how development teams try their best
at integrating security into the development process, research has been performed,
trying to identify possible cracks and sanitize them with new approaches. This
chapter provides practical tools and processes to adopt in order to improve the
security analysis in the entire development process. In section 4.2, proposals can be
adopted in every development environment, while in 4.1 more microservice-related
techniques are documented.
4.1 Improvements for microservice environments
Container clustering orchestration has become very popular whenever containerized
services are in use. According to the 2020 Snyk report[35], Kubernetes has been
chosen by the 44% of the interviewees. Despite the wide adoption, the survey
pointed out how users tend to forget about security requirements. In fact, 30%
of the population confessed to not revising K8s manifests at all.
These statistics should be enough to underline the importance of identify specific
tools to help monitoring new flaws in container clusters as well as enhancing the
security level with new measures.
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4.1.1 Kubernetes security management
Kubernetes take into account security by default, efficiently handling IP addresses
of the pods contained in the cluster and applying controls in order to ensure a
safe communication in between different nodes. Despite these important features,
the orchestrator provides only basic security measures, leaving room for advanced
security monitoring and compliance enforcement.
Thus, admins and DevOps can count on a set of specific tools which have been
designed for the purpose. Among many good products which solve this demand, the
Aqua Security1 solutions are recommended choice of the Center of Internet Security
(CIS)2.
The Aqua kube-bench tool3 strictly follows all the checks that are listed by the CIS
Kubernetes Benchmark[45]. The tool, written in Go and provided as a container,
is able to discover configuration errors, authorization and authenticaton issues and
checks that data flow is reasonably encrypted.
On the same line, Aqua released kube-hunter 4 as well. This one can be considered
as an extension of kube-bench, which enhance the the effectiveness of the analysis
by enhancing discovery and penetration testing capabilities.
Using such solutions is very important nowadays since K8s package managers
(such as Helm5) are ramping up in their usage. These tools are particularly useful
for versioning, but they can also introduce risks that comes from the usage of third
party images. This assumption is confirmed by 2019 Snyk Helm Report[46], which
states that 68% of stable Helm Charts (Helm packages) contain an image with a
high severity vulnerability.
1Aqua Security: https://www.aquasec.com/
2https://www.cisecurity.org/
3kube-bench Github Repository: https://github.com/aquasecurity/kube-bench
4kube-hunter Github Repository: https://github.com/aquasecurity/kube-hunter
5Helm: https://helm.sh/
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4.1.2 Periodic container scans
As the beating heart of each service of the cluster, the (Docker) container cannot
be forget. In the 2020 Snyk report[35], authors highlight that many vulnerabilities
have been discovered from container images labeled as latest. This means that
even using well-known images as baseline for custom containers may represent a
potential issue.
Therefore, this leads to understand the importance of a periodic and automatic
container scanning. DevSecOps engineers should prioritize this practice using open
source tools that accomplish the task. Currently, the most well known one is Clair6,
which is able to perform static analysis based of known vulnerability signatures
stored in a up-to-date database.
4.1.3 Hacking testing environment
Getting hands on practical examples of vulnerabilities can be really useful and in-
structive for both developers and security practicalities. For this reason, it may be
an optimal idea to craft a sort of sandboxed and vulnerable environment where to
train and experiment with exploitation skills. Such playground can be easily created
thanks to projects that have been ad-hoc developed for this reason.
The most famous is probably WebGoat7: a vulnerable web application which
challenges the user thorugh the exploitation of different kind of security holes.
Recently, KubernetesGoat8 has been released on GitHub with almost the same
aim. As the name suggests, a vulnerable K8s cluster configuration is provided to
offer a playground where to practise Kubernetes security.
6Clair Github Repository: https://github.com/quay/clair
7WebGoat GitHub repository: https://github.com/WebGoat
8KubernetesGoat GitHub repository: https://github.com/madhuakula/kubernetes-goat
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ServerlessGoat9 should also be mentioned. The tool is provided by OWASP and
therefore all the vulnerabilities that are listed in the Puresec ten critical risks in
serverless configurations[47] can be reproduced and tested.
Maintaining such testing environments, even combining the mentioned tools or
some other resource, can be really useful to provide test bench for penetration testers:
there it would be possible to safely replicate issues as well as using the environment
as tool for increasing awareness for developers or DevOps.
4.2 General proposals of improvement
Although this work is more focused on analyzing microservice environments, in
this section are collected improvements that can be applied to any development
environment to increase security. Some of the proposals are quite technical and
involve the usage of new tools, but there is room also for more high-level ones that
just aim to increase security awareness.
4.2.1 Periodic vulnerability scans
Every organization should be aware of the critical components that may represent
a potential intrusion vector for an attacker.
As stated by the Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP)
Study Guide[48], each company should establish a routine in order to continuously
audit their systems and network. Such process can be either manual or, preferably,
automatically scheduled and fired.
Many open source tools have been released as well as other commercial solutions.
Each of them can have a narrower or wider scope, respectively resulting in a more
accurate or general reporting system.
9ServerlessGoat GitHub repository: https://github.com/OWASP/Serverless-Goat
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Nessus10 by Tenable is probably the most famous commercial solution available
on the market. On the other hand, OpenVAS11 represents the open source alterna-
tive. With a more specific scope, even Nmap12 can be seen as a vulnerability tester
due to its advanced network scanning capabilities.
Vulnerability scanners usually are focused on code analysis, vulnerability audit-
ing, network scanning or server/cloud configuration analysis. The most sophisticated
ones can also combine more than one scope, even if sometimes organizations prefer
to adopt different and more specified scanners.
Another distinction can be made between external an internal scanners: the first
type ground their analysis only on the publicly exposed resources, while the second
one has the capability to expand the investigation also to resources that require
privileges to be accessed.
The CISSP Study Guide[48] also highlights how crucial it is for organizations
that use these tools to bear in mind the link between the discovered vulnerability
and the real open threat in the current scenario. Missing such connection may lead
to underestimate a vulnerability or, on the contrary, spend too many resources is
something which is already mitigated by design of the actual configuration.
4.2.2 Interactive Application Security Testing
In the previous chapter, DAST and SAST techniques have been described as good
solutions for vulnerability detections. Despite their importance, both of them still
have their limits. Interactive Application Security Testing (IAST) aims to create
a hybrid solution which can combine strengths of SAST and DAST, solving at the
same time their relative drawbacks.
10Tenable Nessus: https://www.tenable.com/products/nessus
11OpenVAS Github Repository: https://github.com/greenbone/openvas
12Nmap: https://nmap.org/
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The analysis is performed by injecting agents into the web application. Such
sensors are able to monitor reactions of the app with respect to received inputs (ei-
ther automated or manual ones). An analyzer processes the detected information
and raises alerts in case vulnerabilities are detected. Agents are able to capture
configurations, network traffic and external service calls as well as monitoring the
overall data flow within the app. Thanks to this capability, more vulnerabilities can
be discovered and the rate of detected false positive or negatives can be drastically
decreased. In fact, such additional information is used to verify vulnerabilities de-
tected though normal SAST or DAST detection processes. Since IAST solutions
have access to the source code, a more accurate report of the discoveries can be
achieved, pointing the precise location of the vulnerability in the code. As draw-
back, this hybrid solution is always more expensive, demanding more resources and
a complex installation process, due to agents to be setup.
4.2.3 Code review exercising
Despite many different ways to discover possible vulnerabilities have been developed
among the years, reducing the likelihood of generating security holes while coding
is still an challenge. This is the conception that the founders of SecureCodeWar-
rior13 are pursuing: the provided platform offers the possibility to train developers
to recognize inconsistencies, well known anti-patterns and vulnerabilities that may
affect the code. The developers of the companies who decide to subscribe with the
platform will get access to internal tournaments, learning material and challenges
that stimulate the critical thinking with respect to the source code. The challenging
formula can be really beneficial for end users, while earned data will offer important
insights about the security awareness of the development team.
Moreover, code review process should be integrated in the normal development
13SecureCodeWarrior: https://securecodewarrior.com
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process, usually through merge request mechanisms that enforce a minimum number
of approval before being accomplished. Gerrit14 is an instance of tool which can be
applied on top of normal git version control to expand review mechanisms.
4.2.4 Penetration testing automation
Trying to break into a system usually requires capabilities that go outside from
what can be automated by a software. Pentesters usually take advantage of their
intuition and lateral thinking, skills that are human prerogatives. Thanks to these
competences, they are able to find a way to compromise a system and, accordingly,
propose a method how to harden the environment in case of attack.
On the other hand, lot of the tasks that may be necessary for information re-
trieval or so can be automated to facilitate and speed up the pentester process. If a
computer is still not able to properly react to certain findings, it is able to highlight
results which may be useful for the tester. For instance, fuzzing or enumeration
techniques in general are processes that requires time to be accomplished. Such
techniques aim to find a valid corrupted payload that may exploit a vulnerabilities,
generating therefore thousands useless requests and, in case, just few valuable out-
comes. This kind of time-consuming tasks can be easily be automated, periodically
repeated and only in case of discoveries an alert can be generated for the tester.
Moreover, not only penetration testers can take advantage of the automation.
Bug bounty hunters may have the possibility to speed up their workflow in an en-
vironment where sometimes be faster than the others make the difference. DevOps
may want to let such test run periodically in order to monitor some critical online
assets or simply to assert that the web application that the development team is
working on is compliant with security standards. Thus, it is worth to integrate such
tests into CI/CD pipelines or to recurrently schedule those.
14Gerrit Code Review: https://www.gerritcodereview.com/
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4.2.5 Dashboards
Sometimes, reading through the lines of logs may appear to be confusing. Even
though that is not true when correct tools are used in the analysis, offering an
immediate and self-explanatory visualization is usually very valuable for a team.
The usage of dashboards is useful for many aspects of the development such as the
resource consumption or APIs call statistics.
The same is applicable for security matters: being able to raise alerts in case of
too many wrong login attempts, detect strange connections with malformed pay-
loads or similar is extremely beneficial for security analysts. As demonstrated by
Mullis and his colleagues[49], dashboards are a fundamental tool for cyber situational
awareness and, therefore, an indispensable tool within every Security Operations
Center (SOC).
But the effectiveness of dashboards are not strictly limited to SOCs: DevOps
can create custom dashboards highlighting insights from the data and logs taken by
the system, helping either developers and security specialists in they job. Such task
can be facilitated by the adoption of the measure proposed in 4.2.6.
The most famous products that are used in the creation of dashboards are
Kibana15 (if an Elastic stack is in place) or Grafana16 as open source alternative.
Intermediate solutions can be adopted in order to extract insights from raw logs and
data: Prometheus17 is a perfect instance that allows to create metrics and generate
alerts accordingly.
15Kibana: https://www.elastic.co/kibana
16Grafana Github Repository: https://github.com/grafana/grafana
17Prometheus: https://prometheus.io/
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4.2.6 Centralized Log Management
Logs are a the most important element which represents the baseline for every kind
of analysis. The more the system is complex, the less intuitive is to get useful
information out of logs. In fact, every entity included in the system itself tend to
produce its own log trace.
Being able to create a common space where all the logs can be directed will offer
to the admins a more comprehensive overview and, therefore, the possibility to get
more useful insights over suspicious patterns.
Such capability of centralize data is not easy to achieve in every environment.
Fortunately, the usage of Server as a Service (SaaS) (discussed in 2.2) helps simplify
the task. Amazon Web Services (AWS)18 gives the possibility to users to convey
logs from different regions and accounts. Third party solutions are also available
on the market: Logstash is the best choice if an Elastic stack is used, otherwise
GrayLog19 or FluentD20 are great solutions too. This kind of tools provide an all-
in-one solution, offering also a visualization of the collected data. Views can be
customized, but most of the times are not flexible enough to satisfy admin needs.
Thus, it is important to choose the correct tool with respect to the current system
configuration.
18AWS Centralized Logging: https://aws.amazon.com/solutions/implementations/centr
alized-logging/
19GreyLog GitHub repositories: https://github.com/Graylog2
20FluentD GitHub repository: https://github.com/fluent/fluentd
5 Currently adopted security
processes and methods
Despite in the last years security is gaining more and more attention, it is still diffi-
cult to identify companies which spent the correct amount of resources in ensuring
their systems and internal processes. Unfortunately, security is more often seen as a
deplorable task that drains resources and provides no tangible results. The reality is
that there is no possibility to achieve a good level of security thinking about it as a
patch which can be applied whenever resources are available. As widely discussed in
chapter 3, security is something that needs to be taken into account from the very
beginning in the design phase, therefore leading to an effective and even cheaper
ecosystem that works in synergy with the rest of the organization’s parts.
In support of the above, the 2020 Snyk report[35] underline that security aware-
ness seems to follow a growing trend within companies, but technical improvements
are still missing in practise. In the same way, GoSecure[50] detected a significant
gap in between the participants’ perceived security and the reality while confronting
the survey’s results with the penetration testers’ experience. Indeed, 26% of the
2020 Skyn report[35] responses stated to completely lack in security practices.
On the base of this assumptions, the aim of this chapter is to underline how far
reality is far from the theoretical model proposed in chapter 3. To better notice the
detachment with expectations, the analysis tries to follow the main SDLC structure.
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5.1 Requirements phase comparison
While discussing about requirements in section 3.2, the ISO 27001 standard has
been reviewed. After a decade is passed from its publication, an analysis over the
adoption has been carried out by Mona Mirtsch and her team[51]. The group used
web mining techniques to retrieve data about a wide landscape of German firms,
either Small-to-Medium Businesses (SMB) and large enterprises.
The outcomes (shown in figure 5.1) bring to light that the growing pace which was
expected for the standard adoption among the last 10 years has not been respected at
all. Reasoning for this insight has been identified into two main points: firstly, a wide
part of the companies that have been taken into account use to take advantage of
commercial partners with a certification to indirectly claim their compliance with the
standard. In fact, SaaS companies and data centers are usually big enterprises that
can easily afford the certification. Therefore, it is convenient for smaller customers
to take advantage of such. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the study showed that
SMBs are the company segment with the lowest adoption rate of the standard. The
second reason, related to this last information, is that a large portion of firms can
also implement their management system standard, simply avoiding to seek the
certification because of the related costs.
Despite the if the research is limited to Germany, there are reasons to think that
the country has been evaluated as representative of the entire continent. In fact,
the research has been mainly supported by the European Commission.
In the light of the latest EU Cybersecurity Act, the authors of the article point
out that, although the adoption of the standard is currently completely voluntary,
it cannot be excluded that it may become mandatory in the near future.
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Figure 5.1: ISO 27001 adoption statistics from [51].
5.2 Design phase comparison
The fast pace of developments and the continuous changing of technologies should
suggest to companies how important would be to share security responsibilities
among developers, security team and operations. Based on the 2020 Snyk report[35],
an improvement under this point of view has been noticed with respect to the pre-
vious years. The interviewees move from a completely unbalanced and unhealthy
developers responsibility towards a more distributed burden with respect to either
software and infrastructure. Despite the encouraging answers, the same report indi-
cates also that firms are lacking in programs to increase this kind of culture across
personnel. In fact, among some common practices with this culture growth aim,
47% of the population reported to have any of those in place. Therefore, still a lot
can be achieved to really establish a balanced perception of security culture.
Another important step that should be done in the design phase is the selection
of tools and packages that will be involved in the development. A package cannot be
choose solely with respect to the technical solutions provided. Software engineers,
together with security team should carefully evaluate their possibilities. Snyk re-
port reveals an encouraging statistics over the interviewees. In fact, 65% of them
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reported to check if an active community is present behind the project, 59% ana-
lyzes the frequency of commits and releases, 58% evaluate the ratings and number
of downloads and the 53% even review known vulnerabilities.
Less encouraging is the figure for the adoption of threat modelling sessions.
Unfortunately, only 19% of respondents use this methodology effectively.
5.3 Implementation phase comparison
As already discussed in section 3.4, software engineers may tend to prefer the devel-
opment phase by underestimating the review of what they produce. Even though
neglecting review phase of your own code is a very difficult task, using the correct
tools may lead to increasing the improve the final result, even before pushing the
commit to the repository. On the same line, restricting capabilities of a service or
forcing the usage of some protocols for the sake of security may sound as a task
which decrease user experience without bringing effective advantages.
5.3.1 Linters usage
As demonstrated by the research conducted by [52], the usage of linters seems to be
strongly linked with the quality of the delivered software. In the study, the authors
took into account the top 30000 starred Javascript repositories in GitHub, analyzing
their configuration files to detect the usage of linters. As shown in table 5.1, there
is an inverse correlation between the number of project taken into account from
the ranking and the related linters usage. In fact, the more low starred projects
are involved in the analysis, the more the linter adopters percentage decrease, until
reaching 28,5% when the entire ranking is taken into account. Instead, 7 out of the
top 10 repositories uses at least one or more of these tools. Taking into consideration
all the repositories involved in the used dataset, the percentage decrease again to
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24,2%. These latter data testify the poor usage of a specific kind of tool that,
looking at the top of the table 5.1, developers should struggle to adopt more and
more within their development environment.
Top projects Projects with linter % of top projects
10 7 70%
100 65 65%
300 185 61.7%
1000 535 53.5%
3000 1371 45.7%
5000 2082 41.6%
10000 3675 36.8%
20000 6306 31.5%
30000 8554 28.5%
83892 20292 24.2%
Table 5.1: Estimation of linters’ usage for 30000 top starred GitHub Javascript
projects, from [52].
5.3.2 HTTP Security Headers usage
HTTPS response headers are a powerful way of enforcing the usage of specific mea-
sures that drastically increase the security of a web application. Despite the re-
markable usefulness, an analysis over the usage of such tool conducted by Artūrs
Lavrenovs and F. Jesús Rubio Melón[53], evidenced the surprisingly low rate of
adoption. Among the one million websites used as test bench for the research, the
29.1% of all HTTPS requests shown incorrect TLS configuration due to untrusted
Certificate Authority (CA), self-signed certificates or expired ones. Implementation
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rates are also linked to the popularity of the website itself. An exponential negative
pattern in adoption rate for all the security headers has been registered following
the popularity curve of the web application taken into account. Specifically, HTTP
Strict Transport Security policy is used by the 17.5% of the entire web resources,
while a 38% of adoption rate has been recorded considering only the first one thou-
sand most popular websites. Only a 1.6% of the one million resources uses CSP,
while 50% uses HttpOnly flag and 19.3% adopt the Secure directive. Information
leakage has been registered to be more frequent among less popular or HTTP sites.
In addition, a recent study conducted by Eman Salem Alashwali[54] highlighted
HTTPS inconsistencies for application and transport layers. A new type of vulner-
ability, called "region confusion", aims to take advantage of the different HTTPS
header protections that the same request from different countries returns as a re-
sult. The paper also provides practical examples of how an attacker can exploit such
inconsistencies.
5.4 Test phase comparison
According to the 2020 Snyk report[35] still the 67% of the interviewees reported to
manually review and discover vulnerabilities inside their code. Still, the 48% of the
population uses audit tools to analyze source code, either automatically of firing the
tool manually. In fact, audits can be easily integrated into pipelines to get the most
out of them together with other sort of controls.
Although the importance of CI/CD processes has been highlighted in section
2.4.2, the DZone trend report[55] presents a good understanding over the real usage
of such tool. Continuous Integration is almost a widely-adopted practise, since the
89% of the teams reported to have automated pipelines to build and test the code.
Following the same nomenclature enforced in 2.4.1, this percentage decrease the
more we move toward production: tests are automatically performed in STAGE
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environment by the 80%, but then in QA and PROD environments the percentage
goes down with respectively 57% and 50%. That being said, more than half of
the respondents (55%) indicate CI as useful to catch problems in the early stage,
estimating around 30% of executed pipelines as failed because of an undetected
error.
According to the 2020 Snyk report[35], the most commonly integrated security
control in pipelines is the SAST, with 57% of adoption among the respondents.
Apparently, SAST is the only control applied by the majority of companies since
only 20% and 19% reported to also respectively use DAST and dependency scanner
tools. Despite Kubernetes is the choice of 44% of companies that leverage over a
container-based infrastructure, only by 28% of the respondents are using security
tools to analyze their manifests.
Speaking about dependencies, their importance and the risk that those introduce
into the source base of a web application seems to be not that well perceived by
most of the organizations: 60% of the organizations involved in the report admit to
miss the analysis of the full dependency tree of their source base, inspecting only
partially the tree or omitting to check it at all.
Back to DZone report[55], Continuous Deployment follows a diminishing trend
of usage nearby the production stage, likewise CI gait. In fact, the 59% reported to
automatically deploy from QA to PROD, followed by 73% and 85% following the
steps backwards. 77% instead, use to deploy to DEV as soon as a commit has been
created. A good practice can be to apply security test cases together with smoke
tests in the CD pipeline: 28% of Snyk report respondents perform such security
controls in QA environment.
DZone report announce a remarkable increment of investments in CI/CD meth-
ods in the last two-three years for SMBs. Despite the positive effects, the integration
of CI/CD methods within the software development process is not immediate. The
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DZone report states that SMBs can achieve the complete process within six up to
nine months, but Large enterprises timing is estimated between six months up to
two years. Even though this shifting periods can be expensive for an organization,
later outcomes (security-wise or not) are remarkable.
5.5 Deploy phase comparison
Supporting the web application once it has been deployed means also patch effec-
tively the system as soon as new potential security holes are discovered. Therefore,
the ability to detect vulnerabilities is important, even if it is even more crucial being
able to solve as soon as possible. According to 2020 Verizon Data Breach Investi-
gation Report[1], 81% of the breaches are contained within days or even less. This
statistic is quite predictable given the severity that can result from an intrusion.
When it comes to fixing vulnerabilities, the readiness to react decreases as there is
no tangible emergency, although the risk may still be very high depending on the
situation. 2020 Snyk report[35] once again provide a good overview on the case:
only 1% of the flaws are fixed within a day from the detection; less then 20 days
is required to handle the 34% of vulnerabilities, while 29% of those are solved in
20-70 days. The remaining 36% of vulnerabilities took more than 70 days in order
to be purged. A reasonable comparison can be made with data provided by 2020
GoSecure report[50], which states that weeks or even more are needed to patch over
the 52% of the vulnerabilities.
It is quite reasonable to think that the urgency of the patch strongly depends
on severity of the vulnerability itself. Perhaps, this is not enough to justify so long
reaction timings, which by average leaves even too much time to potential attackers
to exploit the flaws.
6 Implementation and verification of
the approach: a case study
According to the 2020 Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report[1], the common
shift toward the usage of cloud computing and SaaS solutions hardly contribute to
narrow down the difference of attack rate between large enterprises (which used to
be widely more attractive) and SMB. Even if the split is still high (407 incidents for
SMB against 8666 for large enterprises in the last year), Verizon reports that 28%
of the overall breaches involve SMB. A rising phenomenon, it is useful to observe
how security is treated from a small firm’s perspective.
Having the possibility to have an internal perspective in one of the companies who
decided to implement and use a microservice architecture is a great opportunity to
deeply understand how the workflow is built on the architecture itself. The author of
this thesis had the chance to work for Awake.ai1, a young startup which proposes an
innovative online platform addressed to businesses working in the maritime logistics
field. The company is composed by less then 30 employees in which a small security
team is included. After roughly one year of activity, the company managed to deliver
the Most Valuable Product (MVP) of a web platform which provides to the customer
useful insights and optimization proposals for commercial maritime traffic.
Likewise the previous chapter, the SDLC main structure will be used as backbone
1Awake.ai website: https://www.awake.ai/
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to verify the alignment of the company with either the best practices (chapter 3)
and the real scenario analysis (chapter 5).
6.1 Requirements
Since confidential information is handled by the platform, ensuring that the traffic is
secure in every single step of the dataflow is a priority for the company. Therefore,
it is quite important for the startup to be compliant the ISO 27000 certification.
Security team fixed the certification as a milestone and is working in order improve
what is missing to be fully compliant with the standard. Meanwhile, every time an
architectural decision has to be taken, the security team facilitates the discussion in
order to always take a decision in line with the ISO 27001 standard.
6.2 Design
While software engineers design the architecture of the software, they may need
to integrate the usage of a new library. If that happens, security team is usually
consulted to receive a feedback regarding the third party software and its reliability.
The company uses a cloud computing solution where several different environ-
ments are set up, in line which what described in the section 2.4.1. The development
environment is used as a test bench for testing new features and patches, therefore
every developer is encouraged to use that space without any fear of disrupting the
service. Running each single service locally is still possible and almost every service
is documented with a detailed procedure which explains the steps to take in order
to run the software locally.
The infrastructure is scripted using infrastructure-as-code tools, therefore it is
easy to reestablish a working state of the services in case something goes wrong.
Disaster recovery guidelines are well documented as well and describe every single
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step that is needed to set from scratch the entire infrastructure.
Secrets are handled using the related service offered by the SaaS provider and
is well adopted among all the teams. Quite a lot of effort has been spent in the
last periods before the MVP to centralize the handling of secrets. In addition, the
company is also evaluating the usage of an ad-hoc third party solution which would
allow to decrease dependency from the cloud computing firm, as well as offering
more advanced tools such as the periodic key rotation.
Threat Modeling was not taken into account from the very beginning, but is
now under process. Most important components have been already analyzed and
the rest of the services are in plan. The Data Flow Diagram is used as baseline to
start the discussion, while the STRIDE pattern is usually always visible during the
meetings to keep in mind crucial points to think about. No special tools are used
than a standard whiteboard in addition to the DFD. Usually the head of security
team facilitate the meeting, where the involved developers and the security team
members take part.
6.3 Implementation
During the implementation phase the developers are free to use and test tools which
can improve the flow. Linters are one of those: it is a software engineer’s choice
to setup a linter in his environment. Therefore there are no written conventions
over the code style. Nevertheless, linters are integrated into the pipelines, basically
working as SAST. Therefore, at least a basic scan of the code is enforced and the
commits can also be rejected in case an error is raised.
Speaking about HTTP Security Headers, security team struggled to work in
cooperation with developers to enhance the overall security level of the platform
before the MVP launch. At first, the usage of HTTPS over HTTP has been forced
using redirects, while CORS and CSP headers, together with Cookies directives
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have been configured to restrict as much as possible the attack surface. Particular
attention has been dedicated also to all those headers which can leak useful insights
over the system configuration.
6.4 Test
More than 50 smoke tests are usually fired before committing a deploy in production.
Tests are made against the QA environment using different browsers. Together with
standard functional tests, few security-related ones are included like checks against
XSS attacks or similar.
No automated penetration tests or fuzzing have been configured yet. What has
been developed is a dependency scanner. The tool is deployed as a container within
the cluster and it is fired once per day during the night. Only the dependencies
that eventually end up in the production software are tested and alerts in the in-
ternal chat are pushed in case some vulnerability has been discovered. Because of
the characteristics of microservices, each container can be developed with a differ-
ent programming language. Therefore, the scanner goes through all the different
services and, one by one, detect the used languages and fire relative tools against
the codebase.
Recently, container scanning capabilities have been implemented in the company.
Thus, DevOps and security team decided to follow the same idea of the dependency
scanner, creating a parallel service that can run during night as an additional service.
6.5 Deploy
Since the company is using an agile development process, deployment is usually
forced at the end of each sprint (which can last 2 or 3 weeks). Such deadline is not
that strict in reality since a deployment can be semi-automatically made just by
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tagging a certain repository version as release candidate.
Once the development team creates a release candidate, a CD pipeline is fired
and a small amount of integration test is made. The involved developers are called
to notify the tester that will fire the complete set of smoke tests and, eventually,
will allow software engineers to create deploy to production as well. Such workflow
is not completely in line with the CI/CD philosophy since many manual steps are
still needed in order to deploy a definitive version into the final product, but still
the workflow is lean enough to avoid the acceptance of product owners.
Analytics over the services and the entire platform is available and generates
alerts for DevOps in case strange behaviors are detected. A monitoring tool is
adopted by the company, which allows to retrieve useful insights and logs from the
each single service and from the cluster in general. On top of this information, dif-
ferent dashboards are available to every employee and are generally used to monitor
performance and traffic load among the platform. Since the simplicity of usage, each
developer is encouraged by the DevOps team to craft their own dashboards.
7 Conclusion
A deep analysis over the most up-to-date technologies, best practices and recom-
mendations to ensure web applications based on microservices architecture has been
conducted. Ensuring a web platform effectlively is a task that needs to be accom-
plished working all along the lifecycle that the software development follows. Af-
ter analyzing the ideal Secure Software Development Lifecycle for a company that
adopts microservice architecture, a comparison with the actual measures taken on
average by companies was drawn.
The study showed a clear negative detachment between the current state of the
art and the real approach adopted by the firms. Based on the multiple technical
reports analyzed and in line with the expectations endorsed by the data on attacks
in 2020 reported by Verizon, none of the various phases of the Software Development
Lifecycle can be considered sophisticated in terms of measures taken to avoid possible
cyber attacks.
A virtuous case study was analyzed to understand how much and how the size
of the business can influence the implemented methodologies. Even if not in line
with all the recommendations, the small startup proved to be definitely above av-
erage compared to the previous analysis, suggesting a real advantage brought by
the dynamism of the team and the ability to make changes frequently and quickly,
unlike large enterprises. However, it is not possible to generalise these observations
to all SMBs. Therefore, a possible future study could try to consider more com-
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panies of this size to see if the characteristics found are in line, consolidating the
considerations made in this study.
As an additional future research option, it would be extremely useful to explore
how to accelerate progress for more structured companies, where changes takes al-
ways reasonably more time. In fact, an enterprise needs to carefully evaluate all the
cascade effects of a possible change may provoke, while also the application itself
may require many steps to be accomplished and more policies to be respected.
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